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Abstract 
In peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, soft information, 
such as borrowers’ facial features, textual 
descriptions of loan applications and so on, are 
regarded as potential signals to screen borrowers. In 
this study, we examine the signaling effect of a new 
category of soft information- social media information. 
Leveraging a unique dataset that combines loan data 
from a large P2P lending company with social media 
presence data from a popular social media site, and 
two natural experiments, we find two forms of social 
media information that act as signals of borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. First, borrowers’ choice to 
self-disclose their social media account is a predictor 
of their default probability. Second, borrowers’ social 
media presence, such as their social network and 
social media engagement, are also predictors of 
default probability. This study proffers new insights 
for the screening process in P2P lending and novel 
usage of social media information. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Peer-to-peer lending, also known as P2P lending, 
is the practice of lenders lending money to unrelated 
individuals without going through a 
traditional financial intermediary. Instead, the 
transactions are intermediated by P2P lending 
platforms, which provide online venues for lenders 
and borrowers to communicate and transact. The first 
P2P lending company, Zopa, was founded in UK in 
February 2005. Afterwards, dozens of imitators 
emerge across the world. By the year of 2015, there 
are thousands of P2P lending companies worldwide, 
and the loans funded on the biggest P2P lending 
platform, LendingClub, have reached $7 billion. 
Peer-to-peer loans are unsecured personal loans. 
Lacking effective screening methods on small 
borrowers’ creditworthiness, traditional financial 
institutions tend to do very little screening for small 
borrowers and rely excessively on collaterals [1-4]. 
However, in P2P lending markets, borrowers do not 
provide collateral as a protection to lenders 
against default. This practice, on the one hand, makes 
P2P lending particularly attractive for small borrowers 
who might otherwise turn to pay day lenders or credit 
card debt [5], and on the other hand, makes it very 
challenging for non-expert lenders who have to 
identify credible borrowers and assess default risk by 
themselves.  
Essentially, the financial risk in loan markets is 
caused by information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. In order to alleviate information 
asymmetry, P2P lending platforms encourage 
borrowers to submit as much relevant information as 
possible. The borrower information can be divided 
into two categories: standard ―hard‖ information, 
which directly reflects borrowers’ financial status or 
creditworthiness, such as credit score, debt-to-income 
ratio and annual income; and non-standard ―soft‖ 
information, which has no direct relationship with 
borrowers’ financial status or creditworthiness and 
usually posted by borrowers voluntarily, such as a 
borrower’s picture or a textual description of his future 
plan [6].  
It is found that lenders make use of both 
information categories to infer borrowers’ 
creditworthiness. Soft information is a useful 
supplement to hard information in the loan 
underwriting process, especially for borrowers with 
poor credit, whose hard information is usually 
unattractive [7]. Prior studies has examined the 
signaling effect of a variety of soft information, such 
as borrowers’ pictures, textual descriptions of the 
usage of loans, etc.[7], facial features [8-10] and social 
network characteristics on P2P platforms [11, 12]. 
Different from all these studies, we focus on a new 
and promising category of soft information - 
borrowers’ self-disclosed social media information. 
As one of the most transformative IT applications, 
social media changes people’s life almost in every 
aspect. A recent report from Pew Research Center 
published in 2013 finds that 73% of online adults use a 
social media site of some kind (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, 
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LinkedIn), and 42% of them use two or more social 
media platforms. People use social media to 
communicate, collaborate, consume and even create, 
making social media a valuable information source 
about individuals. In P2P lending platforms, some 
borrowers voluntarily disclose their social media 
account, which makes their social media information 
accessible to lenders or P2P lending platforms. Are 
borrowers who choose to disclose their social media 
account more creditworthy than non-disclosing 
borrowers? Is the social media information they 
choose to disclose useful in assessing their default 
propensity? To our knowledge, no answers have been 
given for these questions yet. 
Our study intends to answer the above questions 
by examining a combined data set obtained from both 
a P2P lending platform and a social media site. We 
first collected loan listing and borrower information 
from a P2P lending platform and marked the 
borrowers who disclosed their account with a certain 
social media site. Then, we collected these borrowers’ 
social media information from the site. With these 
collected data, we model borrowers’ default 
probability as a function of borrowers’ choice to 
disclose their social media account or not, controlling 
for relevant factors such as borrowers’ demographic 
characteristics and identity verifications. The result 
shows that borrowers who disclosed their social media 
information have a significant lower default 
probability compared to those who did not. In order to 
rule out the effect of self-selection, we leverage a 
natural experiment introduced by the P2P lending site 
that enabled borrowers to link to their social media 
sites. We further employ propensity score matching 
(PSM) technique to assess the relationship and the 
results are consistent. Furthermore we examine the 
relationship between borrowers’ social media 
engagement and their default probability. We find 
social media engagement, such as the scope of the 
social network a borrower builds up and his activity 
level in a social media site, act as predictors of 
borrowers’ default probability. 
Our study makes three contributions to the P2P 
lending literature. First, we discover a predictive 
relationship between borrowers’ choice to disclose 
their social media information and their default 
probability. Second, we found borrowers’ social media 
engagement also predicts their default probability. 
These findings identify a new category of soft 
information that is useful for screening borrowers on 
P2P lending platforms. Finally, by examining a unique 
data set combining data from both a P2P lending site 
and a social media site, we have integrated borrowers’ 
financial behavior with their social media 
characteristics for the first time in the literature. 
2. Theoretical Background and 
 Hypotheses 
 
There is a stream of literature that focus on the 
information asymmetry in P2P lending markets. Since 
P2P lenders have less access to ―hard‖ information 
such as borrower credit history, income, or 
employment status, they experience a higher degree of 
information asymmetry as compared to traditional 
lenders. To cope with the shortage of ―hard‖ 
information, P2P lenders tend to make more use of 
―soft‖ information, such as borrowers’ picture or a 
textual description of the purpose of a loan [8-10]. 
Moreover, friendship of borrowers exhibited on a P2P 
lending platform is examined, and certain types of 
friendships show signaling effects on default rate and 
others do not [11, 12].  
Our study complements the recent literature by 
specifically examining a new type of soft information - 
social media information. Although it is related to 
social network, this category of information is 
different from the ―friendship‖ studied by [11, 12] in 
two aspects. First, the ―friendship‖ referred to in our 
studies is not located in a P2P lending platform, but 
located in a social media site instead. Second, social 
media information we examine here includes not only 
borrowers’ friendship information but also borrowers’ 
decision on disclosing their social media accounts, and 
borrowers’ engagement in social media. 
 
2.1 Disclosing Social Media Account as a Predictor 
of Default Probability 
 
In our study, a borrower disclosing his social media 
account on a P2P lending platform means disclosing 
more information about himself, including the social 
network that he builds up in the social media site, 
which raises the possibility that his default behavior 
being known to his friends. Literature on social 
psychology shows that being honest, trustworthy and 
fair is important for a moral social image in the eyes of 
others [13, 14]. A moral failure damages one’s social 
image, and consequently damages social bond to others 
[13-15] and lead to social punishment of being 
marginalized, ostracized, or excluded [14, 16]. Default 
on a loan is very likely to damage someone’s social 
image and causes social punishment. Moreover, 
literature on social capital finds that social capital is a 
valuable resource [17, 18]. The sources of social capital 
lie not only in the structure and content of our social 
relations but also in trust [19-21]. Anything that makes 
someone less trustworthy, such as default on a loan, 
weakens his social capital. Finally, economic theories 
of social stigma points out that a default imposes a 
social stigma cost on a borrower if his friends know 
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about the default [22-24]. Therefore, borrowers who 
are at the risk of default are less inclined to share their 
social media accounts, in order to prevent their friends 
in the social media site from knowing their default in 
case it happens. We therefore propose:  
HYPOTHESIS 1. Borrowers who voluntarily 
disclose their social media accounts on a P2P lending 
platform are less likely to default  
 
2.2 Self-Disclosed Social Media Information as 
Predictors of Default Probability 
 
For those borrowers who have disclosed their 
social media accounts, their social media information 
can be collected and used to predict their default 
probability. In this study, we focus on two social 
media metrics: the scope of borrowers’ social network, 
and borrowers’ engagement in the social media. 
The scope of borrowers’ social network refers to 
how many friends or acquaintances a borrower has in 
his social network. It has an effect on how much 
damage a default could cause to a borrower’s social 
image and social capital, or how much stigma costs a 
default brings about. Specifically, the larger the social 
network, the more damage or costs a default can cause. 
Therefore, a borrower who has a larger social network 
should be more motivated to avoid a default. 
Accordingly, we propose Hypothesis 2a. 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. Borrowers who have a larger 
social network in the social media site are less likely 
to default on the P2P lending platform. 
Borrowers’ engagement refers to how much a 
borrower is involved in the social media site, such as 
how many posts a borrower submit or how many 
dialogues a borrower hosts or joins. It is closely 
related to the time and efforts a borrower invests in the 
social media site. As these inputs are aimed to 
establish a good social image or good relationships 
with others, if a default behavior destroys the 
established social image and relationships, the loss to a 
borrower who has engaged substantially is more than 
that to a borrower who has engaged little. From 
another point of view, the more a borrower engages in 
building up his social image and relationships, the 
more he values the image and relationships. He should 
be more reluctant to default.  Thus, we have  
HYPOTHESIS 2b. Borrowers who have more 
engagement in the social media site are less likely to 
default on the P2P lending platform.  
 
3. Data Collection  
 
A key and notable contribution of our study is that 
we combine data related to borrowers’ financial 
behavior in a P2P lending platform with their 
information in a social media site. In other words, our 
data consists of two parts: P2P lending data and social 
media data.  
 
3.1 P2P lending data 
The P2P lending data come from one of the largest 
online P2P lending platform in China. It was launched 
in June 2007. By the end of 2013, it has had over 
600,000 members and nearly $173 million in funded 
loans. The company, as a platform providing matching 
between borrowers and lenders, requires borrowers to 
provide both loan and personal information for initial 
screening. Loan information includes loan amount, 
duration, and objectives of the loan. Personal 
information includes demographic information, 
education background, income status and any other 
information that the borrower is willing to provide. 
For a loan that passes initial screening, the company 
posts the relevant information on the website. Lenders 
examine such information and decide whether to 
invest, and if yes, how much to invest. The company 
does not provide any guarantee of loan payment. All 
the risks are borne by the lenders. 
Our data sample covers all peer-to-peer lending 
listings on this company between January 2011 and 
August 2013. It consists of 35,457 loan records and 
11,047 borrower records in total. Variables related to 
listed loans include loan amount, interest rate, opening 
and closing dates, credit grade from A (high quality) to 
HR (low quality) and the outcome of loan repayment. 
Variables related to borrowers contain borrower’s 
demographic characteristics, including age, gender, 
education level and marital status, and verification 
items, including identity card verification, education 
certificate verification, phone number verification and 
image verification.  
 
3.2 Social media data 
 
Over 40% borrowers in the company have 
disclosed their Sina microblog account to the platform. 
Sina microblog is the biggest microblog site in China, 
which opened in September 2009 and has had nearly 
300 million users by the end of 2013. The dataset 
obtained includes a variable which marks whether a 
borrower disclosed his/her Sina microblog account. For 
those borrowers who have disclosed their Sina account 
(5239 borrowers in total), we accessed their microblog 
page and collected relevant data. The data we obtained 
from their microblog pages include social network 
scope metric, and engagement metric.  
 
4. Variable Definitions  
 
4.1 Dependent variable 
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Default. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable. The value is 1 if the borrower defaulted on a 
loan and 0 if the borrower never defaulted on any 
loans. A borrower may default on more than one loan, 
but the value of the variable is still 1 in these cases. 
Actually, very few borrowers defaulted on two or 
more loans, since borrowers in default are not allowed 
to make a new loan request.  
 
4.2 Independent variables 
 
Microblog_Disclosed. It is a dummy variable, 
which is 1 if the borrower disclosed his Sina 
microblog account on the ppdai.com platform, 
otherwise is 0. As long as the borrower discloses his 
account, staff on the platform can obtain a verified 
hyperlink to access the borrower’s microblog 
homepage. Through the homepage, the staff can obtain 
more information about the borrower and potentially 
contact his followers listed on his profile page.  
#Followers. For a borrower who has a Sina 
microblog account, followers are the ones who 
subscribe to the borrower’s microblog and follow all 
the updates of the borrower. The number of followers 
can be regarded as a proxy for the scope of borrowers’ 
social network in the Sina microblog site. Moreover, 
followers can be differentiated by whether they are 
followed by the borrower. If two persons follow each 
other’s microblog, they are probably friends and know 
each other in real life, or they are interested in each 
other and want to be friends. If the follower is not 
followed by the borrower, he/she is probably a fan 
rather than a friend of the borrower. Therefore, we 
have two sub-level proxies for the scope of borrowers’ 
social network, that is, #Friends and #Fans.  
#Microblogs. We use the number of microblogs 
that the borrower has posted on his microblog page as 
a measurement of his engagement in the social media 
site, since posting microblogs is the major way for a 
borrower to express himself and to attract followers’ 
attention in the microblog site. Posting more 
microblogs costs the borrower more time and efforts.  
 
4.3 Control Variables 
 
Borrower’s demographic characteristics. This set 
of control variables includes borrowers’ age, gender, 
marital status and education. If a borrower is a male, 
his value of gender is 0; otherwise, the value is 1. If a 
borrower is single, his value of marital status is 0; 
otherwise, the value is 1. The value of education 
corresponds to the highest degree a borrower has 
obtained, which ranges from 1 to 6. The value 1 stands 
for a middle school degree or lower; the value 6 stands 
for a postgraduate degree; and the rest values stand for 
degrees between them. 
Borrower’s pre-verification. It is a set of dummy 
variables. PPdai.com recommends borrowers go 
through a variety of verification processes before 
making a loan request. The processes include 
verification of borrowers’ identity card, education 
certificate, phone number and image (i.e. online visual 
verification). Therefore, we use a set of dummy 
variables to correspond to the processes respectively. 
The value of a dummy variable is 1, if the borrower 
has gone through a specific verification process, 
otherwise the value is 0. 
 
5. Empirical Modeling and Results 
 
We begin by analyzing the relationship between 
the default outcome and borrowers’ choice to disclose 
their microblog account. We use a logit regression 
model first, and then we utilize the propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique and instrument variable 
regressions to address the endogeneity concerns. 
Afterwards, based on the combined data collected 
from the P2P lending platform and the social media 
site, we analyze the effects of social media metrics 
with a logit regression model. The test examines if the 
scope of borrowers’ social network and borrowers’ 
engagement in the social media site have effects on 
default probability.  
 
5.1 The Effect of Microblog Disclosure on Default 
Probability 
In this part of analysis, the sample data is obtained 
from ppdai.com. There are 11047 borrower listings in 
our sample, and 48% borrowers disclose their Sina 
microblog accounts. We model a default as occurring if 
a payment is late by 120 days, which is suggested by 
ppdai.com. 
 
5.1.1 Logistic Regression Model. Table 1 reports 
estimate of a logit model for the probability that a 
borrower defaults on a loan. With a set of control 
variables, we estimate 
                                       
              
The results in Table 1 show that microblog disclosure 
is positively related to the default probability and is 
significant at 0.01 level. Hypothesis 1 is supported. 
 
Table 1. Logit regression model of borrower default 
Variable Parameter Std. error 
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Microblog_disclosed -0.748*** 0.055 
Education -0.150*** 0.024 
Marital status -0.158*** 0.059 
Gender -0.593*** 0.086 
Age -0.012** 0.005 
Image verified 0.090 0.056 
Education verified -0.614*** 0.073 
Phone# verified -0.069 0.063 
IDCertification verified -0.159*** 0.061 
Constant 0.134 0.167 
N 11047 
Log likelihood -5027.467 
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
However, we find that for each covariate, the 
difference in averages by microblog disclosure status 
is significant (see Table 2), which means the data are 
unbalanced in covariates between the group who 
discloses microblog and who does not. The unbalance 
of the data weakens the reliability of the results of the 
regression model [25]. Therefore, we utilize 
Propensity Score Matching to adjust for the 
differences in covariates in the next section.   
 
Table 2. The difference in averages of covariate by microblog disclosure status 
 Mean t-test 
Variable Mblog 
Disclosed=1 
Mblog 
Disclosed=0 
t p 
Education 3.6288 3.6507 -0.99 0.323 
Marital status 1.4614 1.5642 -10.86 0.000 
Gender 1.1262 1.1422 -2.47 0.014 
Age 29.362 30.993 -15.01 0.000 
Image verified .68253 .46551 23.61 0.000 
Education verified .28742 .26295 2.88 0.004 
Phone# verified .86058 .72898 17.29 0.000 
IDCertification verified .84845 .65350 24.21 0.000 
 
5.1.2 PSM. The objective of PSM is to select 
treatment and control borrowers who resemble each 
other in all relevant characteristics except for 
microblog disclosure (the treatment), thereby creating 
a statistical equivalence between the two groups by 
balancing them on observed covariates.  
The first step to perform propensity score 
matching analysis is to estimate the propensity scores 
(PS). A logit model was estimated to derive the 
propensity scores where the outcome variable is 
microblog disclosure. The model is not a behavioral 
one, but simply a statistical device that enables us to 
weight differences in observable variables between 
borrowers who disclose their microblog and those who 
do not. From the weights—the coefficients in the logit 
model—we can construct a propensity score for each 
treated and control case. The PS values summarize 
several characteristics of each subject into a 
single-index, which makes matching subjects on an 
n-dimensional vector of characteristics feasible. These 
results of the logit model along with the fit statistics 
are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Logit regression model of microblog disclosure 
Variable Parameter Std. error 
Education 0.037* 0.020 
Marital status -0.235*** 0.047 
Gender -0.037 0.059 
Age -0.046*** 0.004 
Image verified 0.595*** 0.043 
Education verified -0.170*** 0.052 
Phone# verified -0.563*** 0.053 
IDCertification verified -0.851*** 0.052 
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
We then perform the process of matching the treatment and control borrowers using the estimated 
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propensity scores. Before applying the matching 
methods, we need to make sure that our treated and 
control units share the same support so that they are 
comparable. Treated cases off the common support, 
that is, cases whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or less than the minimum propensity score 
of the controls need to be excluded. In our data set, 
there is only one treated unit off the common support 
and excluded. There are a wide variety of matching 
methods available, such as nearest neighbor matching, 
radius matching and kernel matching. The primary 
advice to select between them is to select the method 
that yields the best balance [27-29]. After trying all the 
aforementioned methods, we find kernel matching is 
the optimal matching method for our study. Table 4 
shows the reduction in bias on observables achieved 
through the kernel matching. From Table 4, it is 
evident that the matching achieves an appreciable 
reduction in bias on observables. Specifically, the 
absolute bias of all the covariates is less than 5%, and 
all the p-values are larger than 0.05. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics and covariate comparison before and after matching 
  
Mean 
 
%reduced t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t| 
Education Unmatched 3.6288 3.6507 -1.9 
 
-0.99 0.323 
 Matched 3.6289 3.6251 0.3 82.5 0.17 0.865 
Marital status Unmatched 1.4614 1.5642 -20.7 
 
-10.86 0.000 
 Matched 1.4613 1.4634 -0.4 97.9 -0.22 0.822 
Gender Unmatched 1.1262 1.1422 -4.7 
 
-2.47 0.014 
 Matched 1.126 1.1279 -0.6 88.2 -0.29 0.770 
Age Unmatched 29.362 30.993 -28.6 
 
-15.01 0.000 
 Matched 29.358 29.531 -3.0 89.4 -1.69 0.091 
Image verified Unmatched .68253 .46551 45.0 
 
23.61 0.000 
 Matched .68266 .67981 0.6 98.7 0.32 0.752 
Edu verified Unmatched .28742 .26295 5.5 
 
2.88 0.004 
 Matched .28747 .29716 -2.2 60.4 -1.10 0.270 
Phone# verified Unmatched .86058 .72898 33.0 
 
17.29 0.000 
 Matched .86074 .86102 -0.1 99.8 -0.04 0.968 
IDCer. verified Unmatched .84845 .6535 46.3 
 
24.21 0.000 
 
Matched .84861 .84812 0.1 99.7 0.07 0.944 
 
Table 5 shows the results of ATTs obtained before 
and after matching. The results support the Hypothesis 
1. We find significant differences in default rate 
between treated and control groups.  
Although the t-statistics obtained after matching is 
smaller than that obtained before matching, the 
statistics is still significant even at p=0.01 level.  
 
Table 5. Comparisons of ATTs 
Variable Sample Treated Controls ATT S.E. T-stat 
Default Unmatched 0.131 0.235 -0.104 0.00731 -14.27 
 
Matched 0.131 0.237 -0.106 0.00813 -13.04 
 
Finally, we conduct sensitivity analysis to check 
for hidden bias. Since matching is based on the 
conditional independence or unconfoundedness 
assumption, if there are unobserved variables that 
simultaneously affect assignment into treatment 
(microblog disclosure) and the outcome variable 
(borrower’s default), a hidden bias might arise [30]. 
Since estimating the magnitude of selection bias with 
non-experimental data is not possible, we address this 
problem with the bounding approach proposed by [30]. 
Instead of testing the unconfoundedness assumption 
itself, Rosenbaum bounds provide evidence on the 
sensitivity degree to which any results hinge on the 
untestable assumption. The results in Table 6 show 
that our study is not sensitive to a hidden bias until the 
bias doubles the odds of borrower’s default. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity analysis: Rosenbaum critical p-values for treatment effect 
Δ p-value 
1.0 <0.0001 
1.1 <0.0001 
1.2 <0.0001 
1.3 <0.0001 
1.4 <0.0001 
1.5 <0.0001 
1.6 <0.0001 
1.7 <0.001 
1.8 <0.01 
1.9 <0.1 
2.0 >0.1 
 
5.1.3 Identification through Instrumental Variable. 
Besides the PSM technique, we also use an 
instrumental variable for microblog disclosure to 
identify causality of the model. A suitable instrument 
for microblog disclosure should be exogenously 
related to borrowers’ decision on disclosing microblog 
but did not affect the likelihood of default. We notice 
that ppdai.com did not provide a function on its 
webpage to help borrowers disclose their microblog 
till the June of 2011, therefore the borrowers who 
registered in ppdai.com before the June of 2011 is less 
likely to disclose their microblog than the borrowers 
who registered after the date. We tested this argument 
and find that the relationship is strongly positive, 
suggesting that registration after 2011 June has a 
predictive power for microblog disclosure. Meanwhile, 
the instrument also meets the exclusion restriction. 
Registration after the June of 2011 could hardly affect 
the likelihood of default through any direct channel 
that is independent of microblog disclosure. The result 
of the IV model is reported in Table 7, where we 
instrument for microblog disclosure with the 
instruments of registration after the June of 2011. The 
result confirms the Hypothesis 1.  
 
Table 7. Results of IV model 
Variable Parameter Std. error 
Microblog_disclosed -1.896*** 0.122 
Controls (Included in estimation) 
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
5.1.4 Difference-in-Difference Model Although the 
result of the logistic model shows that disclosing 
microblog account is a predictor of default probability, 
it does not tell the underlying cause: is it because that 
the borrowers being afraid of social stigma costs? We 
use a DID model to identify the cause. In the April of 
2013, the P2P company launched a marketing 
campaign to encourage borrowers to disclose their 
microblog accounts. We estimate the effect of the 
campaign on the default probability of a loan whose 
borrower disclosed his/her social media account. The 
estimated model is as follows 
  (
              
                
)
                          
                      
                 
The dummy variable Mb_disclosed equals 1 if the 
borrower of a loan has disclosed his microblog, 
otherwise it equals 0. The dummy variable Cmp is a 
time variable, which takes the value 0 and 1 for 
periods prior to and post the campaign. Controls 
represent a vector of loan characteristics, such as loan 
amount, interest rate, and lending period. The main 
parameter of interest is   . The result of    is 
negative and significant (see in Table 8), suggesting 
that this campaign negatively influences the default 
probability of the loans whose borrowers have 
disclosed his/her social media account. One possible 
reason for this to happen is that these borrowers care 
about social stigma costs, because they may worry that 
after this campaign, the P2P lending company could 
use their microblog account as an outlet to spread the 
word if a default occurs, which increases their social 
stigma costs. With this worry in mind, they are less 
likely to default after the campaign. 
 
Table 8. Results of DID Model 
Variables B S.E. Sig. 
Mb_disclosed -.652 .051 .000 
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Cmp               -.199 .052 .000 
Mb_disclosed  Cmp -.274 .087 .002 
Controls (Included in estimation) 
 
5.2 The Effect of Microblog Metrics on Default 
Probability 
For this analysis, we create a combined dataset in 
which data are obtained from ppdai.com and sina.com. 
We select borrowers who disclose their microblog 
accounts in ppdai.com, and collect the microblog 
metrics (e.g. #Followers, #Friends, #Fans and 
#Microblogs) from their profile pages in sina.com. This 
combined data sample includes 5239 listings. 
We use a logit model to estimate the default 
probability of the effect of the microblog metrics on 
default likelihood for borrowers who have disclosed 
his microblog.  
                                    
              
Because of the large variance and scale of the 
microblog metric variables, we take the natural log of 
them in the model. The results are presented in Table 
9.  
 
Table 9. Results of Logit Models 
 M(1) M(2) M(3) M(4) M(5) M(6) M(7) 
#Followers -0.153***  -0.132***    -0.157*** 
 (0.022)  (0.035)    (0.023) 
#Microblogs  -0.121*** -0.024 -0.043* -0.047   
  (0.020) (0.032) (0.026) (0.030)   
#Friends    -0.174***  -0.153***  
    (0.039)  (0.038)  
#Fans     -0.111*** -0.079***  
     (0.034) (0.028)  
Influential       0.062 
       (0.099) 
Controls (Included in estimation) 
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
Model (1) and (2) analyze the effect of #Followers 
and #Microblogs, respectively. The independent 
variable in both models is negatively related to the 
default probability at the 0.01 significance level. The 
results demonstrate that the larger the scope of the 
social network a borrower has in a social media site, 
the less likely he defaults on a loan; the more 
engagement a borrower has with his social media site, 
the less likely he defaults. Both Hypothesis 2a and 2b 
are supported. 
However, the effect of #Microblogs is no longer 
significant when both #Followers and #Microblogs are 
included in Model (3), which indicates that 
#Microblogs may be closely related to #Followers. As 
mentioned before, followers can be categorized into 
friends and fans in the microblog site. Since writing 
microblogs are the major way for a borrower to attract 
fans, #Fans probably has a strong relationship with 
#Microblogs. While friends are usually acquaintances 
in real life, #Friends is likely to have a weaker 
relationship with #Microblogs. In other words, the 
information that #Microblogs conveys is a supplement 
to #Friends, but not to #Fans. It is confirmed by the 
results of Model (4) and (5). 
We next examine the effect of two different types 
of social network, that is, friends and fans. For a 
borrower, both friends and fans he has in the 
microblog site are the sources of his social capital. 
Either friends or fans knowing about a borrower’s 
default can damage his social image and cause a social 
stigma cost, therefore, both #Friends and #Fans should 
have an effect on borrower’s default likelihood. 
However, as previous studies have demonstrated, close 
friends have a stronger behavioral effect on each other 
than strangers do [31, 32]. We therefore expected that 
the effect of #Friends on borrowers’ default likelihood 
should be more intensive than that of #Fans. Model (6) 
shows that #Friends and #Fans are both negatively 
related to the default probability with p<0.01, but the 
coefficient of #Friends almost doubles relative to that 
of #Fans. The results indicate that although both 
variables are predictors of default likelihood, #Friends 
is a stronger signal than #Fans.  
We also consider that a borrower having a large 
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#Followers is more likely to have a healthy financial 
situation as an influential person. Therefore, their low 
default probability may be due to their financial 
well-being instead of avoiding costs in social capital. 
To examine this probability, we ran Model (7) with an 
additional term for a borrower’s influence, which can 
also be regarded as proxies for financial position. From 
Sina microblog site, we get not only the data of how 
many followers a borrower has (e.g. #Followers) but 
also the data of how many people the borrower is 
following (e.g. #Followings). It is reasonable to assume 
that #Followers of influential borrowers is always 
greater than #Following. Therefore, we created a 
dummy variable ―Influential‖, whose value equals to 1 
when #Followers is greater than #Following, otherwise, 
equals to 0. The result of Model (7) shows that 
#Followers remain significant while Influential is not 
significant. The former conjecture is denied.  
 
5.3 Prediction Performance of the Models 
 
We have proposed several variables as predictors 
of borrowers’ default likelihood. In order to 
demonstrate their prediction power, we evaluate the 
proposed models with AUC, which is the area under 
the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve. 
AUC is a standard metric for assessing models that 
predict classification probabilities [33]. A model that 
yields a higher AUC generally offers greater 
predictive power than a model that produces a lower 
AUC [34]. 
In Table 10, we show AUCs of the proposed 
models and those of the benchmark models (the 
models without the proposed variables). The 
integrated model in the last column includes the 
variables of both microblog_disclosed and microblog 
metrics (#Fans and #Friends).  
 
Table 10. AUCs of Models 
 Microblog_Disclosed  Microblog Metrics  
Integrated 
Model Model Benchmark Proposed  Benchmark M(1) M(2) M(4) M(6)  
AUC 0.6231 0.6573  0.6247 0.6522 0.6456 0.6534 0.6557  0.6636 
 
First, all the AUCs in Table 10 are greater than 0.5, 
which suggests that the predictive power of the models 
is higher than that of random guess [34]. Second, 
Table 10 shows that the AUCs of all the proposed 
models are greater than the benchmark models, which 
means the proposed models have more predictive 
power than the benchmark models. Finally, the 
integrated model, which includes all the proposed 
variables, has the largest predictive power among all 
the models. These results indicate that the models with 
soft information on borrowers’ social media 
outperform the models without such information.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we study the signaling effect of social 
media information on borrowers’ credit worthiness in 
P2P lending. The results suggest that social media 
information can be the signal of creditworthiness on 
two levels. On the first level, for all the borrowers in 
the market, their decision on whether disclosing their 
social media accounts or not is a predictor of their 
default probability. On the second level, for the 
borrowers who choose to disclose their social media 
accounts, their social media metrics, such as their 
social network scope and their inputs in the social 
media site, are predictors of default probability.  
Our study contributes to the literature across IS and 
finance disciplines. Lenders on P2P lending 
marketplaces use soft information to screen borrowers 
[7], and our study adds to the literature on soft 
information [8-12] by examining a new category of soft 
information. Specifically, our results indicate that 
social media information is useful for the prediction of 
borrowers’ default probability. To our knowledge, it is 
the first study that examines the usage of social media 
in personal finance. While most of literature regards 
social media as a marketing tool, we provides a new 
point of view by regarding social media as an 
information source for individual creditworthiness. 
Moreover, our results provide a new insight to 
improve risk control in P2P lending in China. On the 
one hand, individuals in China do not have a 
well-verified credit score, such as FICO score, which 
enlarges the information asymmetry in Chinese P2P 
lending markets. On the other hand, about 80% of 
Internet users in China have a social media account 
[35]. Their social media activity provides a rich set of 
information that could be used by P2P lending markets 
for credit assessment. Our study demonstrates the 
validity of this approach and highlights the importance 
of leveraging social media information in P2P lending 
markets in China. 
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